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No country has a good code of laws. The reason for this is
evident: the laws have been made according to the time, the
place [and] the need. When the needs have changed, the
laws which have remained have become ridiculous. Thus
the law which forbade the eating of pig and the drinking of
wine was very reasonable in Arabia, where pig and wine are
injurious. But it is absurd at Constantinople.
Voltaire, Laws, from the
Philisophical Dictionary
An assault is an assault and a battery is a battery. In every
jurisdiction in the United States these common-law torts are actionable,
civilly and criminally. One is not privileged to strike the landlord, the
policeman, or the professor except in self defense. If one disagrees
with an opponent he should seek legal redress-except in labor disputes.
The mystique of labor law is that strike violence is an aberration so
strange and perplexing that ordinary standards of assault and battery
simply will not do. The theory seems to be that, since violence is
a traditional part of labor disputes, tradition sanctions its use. This
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point of view was articulated by the Third Circuit in Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB:'

We think it must be conceded, however, that some disorder
is unfortunately quite usual in an extensive or long drawn
out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose
feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth
hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The
transformation from economic to physical combat by those
engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool
heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much
it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of
the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of the Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 163, that nothing therein should be construed so
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike. If this were not so the rights afforded to
employees by the Act would be indeed illusory.
The court did not attempt to document its assumption that the right
to strike is illusory if not accompanied by violence. Indeed, had it
attempted to do so it would have searched the legislative history in
vain. Nevertheless, the Republic Steel concept of strike violence is
widely held, and as a result strike violence has achieved a protection
afforded no other violent conduct.
The Problem
The strike is the union's ultimate weapon. Its success depends
on closing the plant and keeping it closed until the employer comes to
terms. Strike violence generally erupts only when the employer attempts to continue operating during the strike, using supervisors,
permanent replacements, and returning employees. When persons
begin to cross the picket line-though they have a legal right to do
so
unions see the economic injury to the employer diminishing.
No one quarrels with the union's right to picket peacefully. But
peaceful picketing does not always do the job.3 The message is far
stronger when backed up by dozens of men, whose demeanor runs from
anger to sullen fury. If the picketing should result in violence, unions
seek to convince police chiefs, sheriffs and judges that any effort to
curb strike misconduct is "taking sides" and, in effect, "strike
breaking."
1107 F.2d 47Z, 479 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
2United Steelworkers (Wright Line Div.), 146 N.L.R.B. 71, 75 (1964).

3At one time, this subject was a favorite in the reviews.

For an excellent sum-

mary, see GREGORY, LABOa AND THE LAW 289-340 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
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No union openly avows strike violence. All say it is lamentable.
But the assemblage of the crowd invites its use. The psychological
workings of a crowd have been extensively analyzed by persons competent to do so.4 The rhythm of crowd behavior-its assemblage, destructiveness, and discharge-is clearly applicable to strike misconduct.
Therefore, whether it is manipulated or allowed to follow its own bent
is really beside the point.5 The crowd keeps the plant closed, and the
economic aim is achieved.'
Strike violence is permitted, we believe, because the local law
enforcement officials are politically vulnerable. Few of the authorities
charged with maintaining peace and order do so in a strike with any
great relish. They quietly defer, when they can, to another agency.
On the other hand, for all intents and purposes, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act says that federal courts must defer when faced with picket line
misconduct.7 This act strips the federal courts of any real power over
strike violence. It would be useless to attempt to alter the political
realities. The only realistic way to prevent strike violence is to
restore the injunctive power of the federal courts.
An injunction is the only meaningful remedy against strike violence.
Damage actions, tried years later to a jury, have little present effect.
Arrests are not effective because unions are generally able to post bond
or find replacements. Discharges for strike violence generally prolong
a strike. In addition, unions cling to the hope that the National Labor
Relations Board, an arbitrator, or the strike settlement will reinstate
everyone. But the injunction operates here and now; it runs not only
to the union, but to all operating in concert with the union; it is enforced by the court that issued it through proceedings that sometimes
end in criminal sanctions.
Although initially there may have been valid reasons for passing
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, thirty-four years later, the act shows its
age. As Professor Gregory has written:
Enough has been said, however, to show that it is high time
for a complete overhauling of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Its original purpose-enabling unions to organize by recourse
to economic pressures-has long since been fulfilled; and in
many ways the statute has become obsolete. Certainly the
situations in which it now plays an important role suggest
that already powerful unions are using it to obstruct whole4 See, e.g., CANETTI, CROWDS AND PowER 16-22, 485-95 (1960); PENROSR,

ON

THE OBJECTIVE STUDY OF CROWD BEHAVIOR (1952).
5 CANETTI, op. cit. supra note 4, at 19-26.

6 In this connection, civil rights leaders have been far more candid about the
violence that attends their cause. See Time, Aug. 20, 1965, p. 17.
747 Stat 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
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some developments, to evade their responsibilities, and unfairly to serve their own interests in ways forbidden to others.
Where the Supreme Court either will not or cannot do anything about this, perhaps Congress should reconsider the area
of immunity afforded to unions in their recourse to economic
pressures in pursuit of their self-interest.$
Norris-LaGuardia---ItsObjectives
Norris-LaGuardia erected stiff standards before a federal court
could enjoin strike violence. Section 7 requires:
1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be
committed, or will be continued unless restrained,
2) That substantial and irreparable injury will follow if no
injunction is issued,
3) That as to each item of relief granted, bigger or greater
injury will be inflicted upon the plaintiff by denial of the
relief' than upon the defendant by the granting of the
relief,
4) That no adequate remedy is present at law, and
5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
the plaintiff's property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection.9
There follows a provision for a temporary restraining order not to
exceed five days.
The first four requirements of section 7 are those traditionally
required by equity jurisprudence. It is the fifth requirement, "that
the public officers charged with the duty" of protecting property are
"unable or unwilling" to do their duty, which has made injunctions
against strike violence extremely rare. In supporting this fifth requirement Professor Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene in The Labor
Injunction wrote that
violence and other breaches of the peace are concededly the
primary concern of the police and the machinery of the criminal law. To require, therefore, proof by complainant to the
court's satisfaction that the normal resources of government
are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection emphasizes official responsibility, and at the same time checks
dangerous short cuts in the enforcement of the criminal law.'"
8 GREGORY,
9
10

op. cit. supra note 3, at 551.
Norris-La Guardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
FRANKFURTER

& GREENE, THE

LABOR INJUNCTION

222

(1930).
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None of the proponents of the bill saw Norris-LaGuardia as sanctioning
violent conduct. Senator Norris' report stated that "it is not sought
by this bill to take away from the judicial power any jurisdiction to
restrain by injunctive process, unlawful acts, or acts of fraud or
violence." " Similarly, Congressman LaGuardia wrote that labor
disputes were to be immune from the injunctive process only so long
as that conduct did not involve "fraud or violence." "
Nonetheless, the minority views of the Senate committee as to
the effect of the fifth requirement of section 7 were prophetic:
All such officers are required to be given personal notice of
the hearing. The difficulties thus created must be apparent.
They would impose a great burden upon the complainant,
first to ascertain the names and official duties of all officers
charged with the protection of property, and second, to prove
(a) that they have failed to afford protection, or (b) that
they have been unable to do so.
It must be remembered that many of the acts of which
employers of labor have complained in the course of labor
disputes are not of the nature which come within the purview
of the duties of public officers generally. Even a most cursory
examination of the forms of injunctions which have heretofore
been issued in labor disputes will disclose this fact. If, however, the provisions of paragraph (e) are to be limited in
their operation to acts of destruction of property, there again
the difficulty of establishing proof of neglect or inability of
public officers to afford protection may, in some instances,
and no doubt will, be impossible to sustain. We can well
visualize a situation where the destruction of property has
occurred wholly without the knowledge of public officers, and
yet in seeking to establish proof that such public officers are
unable or unwilling to furnish protection it would be quite
impossible to do so. 3
The Act in Application
In 1966, after thirty-four years of experience, the conclusion that
the injunction should not supplement the local constabulary is too
facile. The differences between an injunction and an arrest are sharp.
An injunction runs to the union and all acting in concert with it;
arrests run only to individuals. It is the union which manages the
strike. Its effectiveness in this area is peculiarly institutional and
wholly apart from individual responsibility.' 4
21
S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1932) (majority report).
12 H.R. RP. No. 669, 72d Cong., lst Sess. 7 (1932).
13 S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. Part II, 11-12 (1932) (minority report).
14 See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-ManagementRelations Act, 1947: I, 61
HAIv. L. REv. 1, 25, 46-47 (1947).
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Local criminal arrests are hardly the solution. The individual
filing the arrest warrant has no control over its prosecution, and the
prosecutor, who thereafter controls the suit, may be less than diligent
in attempting to secure a conviction. 5 Frequently he has an eye on the
ballot box. It is not unknown for strike misconduct cases to be continued and continued until the strike is over, then dismissed. Moreover, the criminal sanction, even if pursued, may be totally inadequate.
Juries may not convict because they do not like the action." Even
if they are willing to convict, the punishment may not be enough to act
as a deterrent.' 7 A union whose objective is keeping a struck plant
closed may look on payment of a small fine with equanimity. The injunction, looking to present and future conduct, is a far greater block
to violence than one, or a dozen, arrests.'
Whether foreseen or not, the requirement that the employer must
prove local police officers unable or unwilling to do their job has been
almost impossible to surmount. For example, in Donnelly Garment
Co. v. Dubinsky,'0 the employer notified the sheriff of Jackson County,
Missouri, and the chief officer of the Kansas City police force of the
hearing on its application for a Norris-La Guardia injunction. Neither
of these officials was called to the stand. The court stated that the
failure to call them "justifies, if it does not compel, the inference that
the testimony of the absent witnesses would have been against the
[employer]." The court did not consider the possibility that the
police would be reluctant to testify that they were unable to perform
their duty effectively. Needless to say, the publicity attending strike
proceedings is not likely to make police officers garrulous. Yet without their testimony federal courts are now powerless to restrain union
violence.
Courts are also unwilling to find the police derelict in their duty,
even when the police testify that they do not know what their duty is.
In Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson,2" the chief of police and the sheriff
15 Developments in the Law--Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1016 (1965).
1 Ibid.
17Ibid.; see Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union (Baronet of Puerto Rico, Inc.),

133 N.L.R.B. 1617, 1627-28 (1961), where persons were prohibited from entering the
plant, cars were rocked and damaged, and men were struck-all in plain view of
police. Though the police acted in each specific event, the arrests merely served to
withdraw one wrongdoer from the fray. The others continued as before.
18 See the order in the national steel strike of 1959, United States v. United Steelworkers, 178 F. Supp. 297-98 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 361
U.S. 39 (1959), 58 MicEr. L. REv. 595 (1960). Such an order does not violate the
involuntary servitude prohibition in the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.
General Elec. Co. v. UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139, 157-61, 108 N.E.2d 211, 222-42, appeal
dismissed, 158 Ohio St 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
1 154 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946).
20 7

F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Ill. 1934).
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testified that it was their "understanding, in substance, that mass picketing is entirely lawful, and, as officers charged with the duty of protecting personal and property right [sic] from unlawful invasion . . .
their only recourse . .

is to attend where such mass picketing is in

progress to prevent riots, traffic jams, fighting, assaults .
The court denied the injunction in the expressed hope that now the
police knew mass picketing was unlawful under Illinois law-as it
had been for many years-they would thereafter do their duty. Unfortunately, few courts have been able to view strike violence as dispassionately as one court did in sensibly observing that at best police
cannot maintain all law and order at a struck plant:
No just complaint can be made of the conduct of the
police. They have afforded the plaintiff all the protection
which it is possible to give. No police protection is adequate
in a strike or can be fully given. This strike is an illustration.
If the expression is an allowable one, it is as orderly a strike
as any could be. Notwithstanding this there has been resort
to unjustified violence. How much more there would have
been and may yet be except for the proceedings instituted to
restrain violence cannot be forecast. The good old Patrick
Henry rule justifies the inference that there will be violence
from the fact that there has been. The finding called for may
be made. 2
The Police
"Votes are the currency of politics." 23 Most sheriffs and police
departments are either elected, or responsible to elected officials, and
here lies the root of the problem. Rightly or wrongly, many elected
officials believe that unions, when aroused, can secure their defeat.
A public official sees many votes on the picket line; few in the office.
Perhaps in 1932 it was true that local officials were ignorant of union
objectives and brutal in the extreme toward peaceful picketers. Nothing could be further from the truth in 1966.
Extensive research into police protection of mass picketing and
violence in Philadelphia showed an astonishing lack of concern for
law and order.' The official police policy has been that enforcement
21

1d. at 337.

Compare Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, 111 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.

1940), where the court said: "No doubt the protection which the statute contemplates is that which would have enabled the plaintiffs to proceed with work on the
projects. No such protection was forthcoming." Id. at 977. There, the police chief,
when asked for help, advised the employer to agree to the union's demands. Ibid.
22
Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor, 25 F. Supp. 996, 998 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
23 Swigert Where Labor Unions Get Their Power, U.S. News & World Report,
Jan. 21, 1963, p. 96.
24
Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1964).
Contempt for law and order generates further contempt. In the 1966 transit
strike in New York, after the head of the union received an order citing him for
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of access rights to a struck plant "would be taking sides in the labor
disputes." 25 Police make no arrests, which encourages the attitude
expressed by one union leader that "as long as we're not in jail, we're
not breaking the law. If we broke the law, we would be arrested." 20
Philadelphia police apparently welcome and encourage a company to
resort to the courts because this alleviates their responsibility. Police
inaction has the expected result: mass picketing and violence reach
mammoth proportions before the sheer volume of misconduct generates some restraint.
The Philadelphia experience is not at all unusual:
1. At a strike of the Bethlehem Ship Yards in Quincy, Massachusetts, where incidents of unlawful picketing lasted over a period of
two months, the general manager requested the police to open a massed
picket line so that he and an assistant could go into their offices. "The
pickets pushed the police back into the middle of the street. The police
captain then told .

.

.

[the general manager] that they could not

get them through." 27 Twice, pickets forced the police chief and his
subordinates into the street.28 On one occasion, the police chief told
the assistant plant superintendent that he could not gain plant entrance
for the group unless the picket captain ordered the line open.29 Finally,
with about seventy-five policemen standing nearby in the street, nineteen top management people were permitted by the pickets to go in.
"As the group 'squeezed' by, they were continually being kicked in the
shins and jabbed in the ribs with elbows." "
2. In Worcester, Massachusetts, at a strike of the Charles Weinstein Company,3 ' a nonstriker who went through the picket line was
grabbed, twisted and pinched. Another nonstriker called out of the
plant window and asked a nearby police officer, "Hey, officer, can't
you see what's going on down there? Why don't you do something
about that ?" The police officer "put his hands on his hips and looked
down the street .

.

.

turned his back on us."

82

Again, a nonstriker

contempt he stated "Just as we promised you, . . . the judge can drop dead in his
black robes. Personally I don't care if I rot in jail." He also invited "the sheriff
and his lackeys" to come and pick him up for jail. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5,
1966,2 5p. 2, col. 3.
Id. at 123.
26Id. at 116.
27 Industral Union of Marine Workers (Bethlehem Steel Co.), 130 N.L.R.B.
412, 416 (1961).
28
Id. at 417.
29
Id. at 421.

30 Id. at 422.
31 Central Mass. Joint Bd. (Charles Weinstein Co.), 123 N.L.R.B. 590 (1959).
32
Id. at 598.
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said "Officer, what's the matter with you? Can't you see what's going
on down there?" The officer, "didn't pay attention, and he didn't
even look." " Later in the strike, pickets refused to let a truck leave
the struck plant, and upon complaining to police officers sitting in a
patrol car after something was thrown at the truck cab, the policeman
said "go up and tell [the owner] .

.

,

he knows them all, and

let him get a complaint." 4
3. Pickets armed with clubs put large railroad ties across the main
plant entrance in a strike at Smith Cabinet, 11 Salem, Indiana. At another entrance steel gutter plates, permanently attached to a concrete
base by hinges on the plant side, were raised ten or twelve inches from
the ground and bricks and blocks were inserted beneath them, thus
preventing the passage of automobiles into the plant. After several
days, the vice president of the company, accompanied by the chief of
police, went to the plant and asked the president of the local union to
lower the barricade. The president of the union said he would, but he
also said he would smash the windshields if the company attempted to
bring in cars. After the chief of police extracted from the company
a promise "not to crash the picket line," the union agreed and the bar36
ricades were lowered.
4. Strike violence in the mine fields is notorious.

In West

Kentucky Coal Co.3 7 roving United Mine Workers' pickets told mine

operators in West Virginia and Kentucky to stop operating. The
sheriff and the police captain advised the company to "yield unconditionally to the UMW demands saying there were too many men in
the invading force for them 'to control' or 'try to handle.' "38 The
sheriff advised the company to agree to UMW demands because he
On other
was " 'just unable to handle a group of men like this.' "3
occasions, police officers said they could not keep UMW pickets off
the company's property line and advised them to go to the office and
await a UMW committee who would call upon them.40 One mine
was shut down when the sheriff said that " 'for the safety of all concerned,' " he thought "it best" for the mine superintendent to yield to
UMW demands that the mine be shut down.4 ' At another mine the
33 Ibid.
34

1d. at 602.

85 United Furniture Workers (Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949).
8
Id. at 901.
37
United Mine Workers (West Kentucky Coal Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 916 (1950),
enforced, 195 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 920 (1953).
38 92 N.L.R.B. at 934.
380 Id. at 937.
4 Id. at 938.
41 Id. at 940.
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state police advised that violence could best be avoided by closing the
mines. The employers yielded. 2
5. At a newspaper strike in Youngstown, Ohio: "The record indicates that the police department maintained an attitude of neutrality
throughout the strike and that no arrests were made even when assaults
and other serious acts of misconduct occurred in the presence of police
officers, as for example during the main mass picketing period from
August 19 through 24.

.

.

These examples are not culled from a manufacturers' bulletin.
They are taken almost at random from reports of trial examiners for
the National Labor Relations Board.'
It is obvious that police inactivity in the face of picket line violence generates more violence.
Although federal law gives employees the right to cross a picket line,
this right is meaningless unless it can be protected. Police officers who
are "neutral" in the face of strike violence are of course taking sides.
This is not neutrality; it is capitulation.
The Governors
The larger strike, of course, touches higher levels of the political
network. Governors, too, want reelection. A vivid example of gubernatorial action is found in the case of Wilson & Co. v. Freeman.5
There, the strike began at the Wilson Company's packing plant at
Albert Lea, Minnesota. After negotiations stalled, the company resumed production, first with supervisors and then with permanent
42

Id.at 943.
Intermediate Report, American Newspaper Guild (Vindicator Printing Co.),
151 N.L.R.B. No. 154, n.4 (1965).
44 See also United Steelworkers (Wright Line Div.), 146 N.L.R.B. 71, 74 (1964)
(police unable to cope with violence) ; Taxicab Drivers Union (Crown Metal Mfg.
Co.), 145 N.L.R.B. 197 (1963), enforced, 340 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Street, Elec.
Ry. Employees (Plymouth & Brockton Street Ry.), 142 N.L.R.B. 174, 178-79 (1963)
(on one day, police unable to disperse pickets and none of the company's busses could
run) ; District 65, Retail Store Union (I. Posner, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1562-65
(1961) (violence occurs on picket line despite presence of police) ; United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B. 127 (1961), modified on other grounds, 311
F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 492 (1964) ; Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen (Phelps Dodge Corp.), 130 N.L.R.B. 1147, 1156 (1961) (despite presence of
the sheriff, full access to employer's premises denied) ; Local 901, Teamsters Union
(Editorial "El Imparical", Inc.), 129 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1376 (1961) (police arrested
one picket, but quickly released him; violence on the picket line continued) ; UMW
(Blue Ridge Coal Corp.), 129 N.L.R.B. 146 (1960) (firearms carried on picket line
with at least one incident where shooting occurred; police unable to be present at
all times to allow full access to employer's premises; violence ran rampant) ; United
Elec. Workers, 106 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1953); National Union of Marine Cooks (IrwinLyons Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
4 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
For a discussion of the actions of Governor
Romney in closing the plant and removing company guards from the Essex Wire and
Steel strike in Hillsdale, Michigan, see Howlett, The Battle of Hillsdale-The Essex
Wire Strike Emergency, 15 LAB. L.J. 770 (1964).
43
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replacements. An injunction from a local court was ignored. The
strikers threw rocks, smashed windows, and threatened nonstrikers
with bodily harm.
Police, as well as union officials, unsuccessfully attempted
to quell the acts of violence and the massing of pickets by
pleading with the pickets to disperse, to refrain from violence,
and to return to their homes. However, such pleas were of
no avail. No attempts were made by the police to arrest any
of the mob indulging in the acts of violence.",
At the height of the violence, local law enforcement officials requested
Orville L. Freeman, then governor of Minnesota, to assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and to close the plant temporarily, which he did, declaring a state of martial law in Albert Lea.
A federal district court of three judges went to the heart of the governor's order:
Obviously, however, plaintiff was within its rights notwithstanding the strike in attempting to keep its plant in production and to afford employment to those persons who were
willing to work. Plaintiff is protected by the Constitution of
the United States in its right to possess its property and to
use it in any lawful manner that it may desire to pursue.
Plaintiff cannot be held responsible for mob violence which
was allegedly precipitated by its attempt to keep its plant open.
A strike by union workers does not prevent4the
employer from
7
employing non-union workers in its plant
Peace and order may be restored by acceding to the demands of the mob, but at the sacrifice of law. Such expedient
measures would encourage and breed mob rule and law violations in every labor dispute. No citizen would be secure
in the peaceful possession of his property.4 8
The governor and the state militia were enjoined from unconstitutionally depriving Wilson and Company of the lawful use of its property.
The problems of strike violence become still more dramatic when
the governor refuses to act. In Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v.
Mayo,49 recognition picketing brought the port of St. Charles, Louisiana, to a complete halt. Appeals were made first to the sheriff, then
to the governor. The sheriff said he was unable to increase his depu4

GWilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520, 523 (D. Minn. 1959).

471d. at 525.
48 Id.

at 527.

49 20

F. Supp. 698 (W.D. La. 1935).

470

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.l14:459

ties (at that time five) without the approval of a bureau dominated by
the governor. The governor declined. Local authorities then appealed directly to the governor to use state police or the National Guard.
He refused. Then the local employers' association hired guards to protect its property. Three of them were murdered; six were wounded.
A federal injunction was granted.
There probably would not have been any shooting but
for the bringing into the port of the heavily armed guards,
and a sufficient number of bona fide and impartial deputy
sheriffs or other recognized state officers to maintain peace
had been sent to the scene by the Governor or other state authorities, upon whom the responsibility for maintaining peace
and order rested. The attitude of these officials is rather
forcefully illustrated by the fact that one of the two deputy
sheriffs supplied had three sons in the picket line. Both the
sheriff and the Governor, as well as their adherents, were in
the midst of a campaign for the general state election of officers . . . and there appears little doubt but that this fact

accounts for the failure or refusal of these officials to do their
duty. In other words, politics was being played at the risk
of human life. 50
The State Courts
Sir Francis Bacon wrote that "A popular judge is a deformed
thing, and plaudits are fitter for players than for magistrates." "' Perhaps this was true at the turn of the seventeenth century, but today
most state judges are elected and as a result there is a premium on
popularity. It is not by accident that in the constitution of the International Association of Machinists, for example, a stated aim is that
"all judges, without exception,
people." 52

be elected by a vote of the

The Labor Injunction's underlying thesis was that injunctions
were entirely too easy for employers to obtain. Though there has been
abundant criticism of the excessive use of injunctions, there is almost
no literature on the wrongful denial of an injunction. One reason for
this is that there is virtually no record of most of these cases. Denials
of temporary restraining orders are usually not appealable; they are
almost never reported. The denial remains in the memory-and tactical position-of the losing party. "The law's delay works a special
hardship in labor cases. If a strike or picket line is enjoined, the
6oId. at 701.

51
THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORISmS 208 (1962).
5

2 CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AssocIArION OF MACHINISTS

(1965).
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unions lose. If it is denied, management will probably settle. In
either case, there is little pressure to obtain a 'correct' ruling from the
state supreme court. Only when a union desires to get an authoritative holding for future activity will it appeal." 3
No other section of this article has been as difficult to write; the
information is just not available. But scattered bits and pieces indicate
that employers have a difficult time in some state courts when they try
to enjoin union violence. The student research into Philadelphia strike
activity shows that judges are extremely reluctant to issue a restraining
order; " they first prefer a conference in chambers,55 which is supposed to produce a "gentlemen's agreement" that access to a struck
plant will be permitted. Weeks may pass before the employer's legal
right to operate, and the employees' legal rights to ignore strike pressure, are observed. For example, the 1960 General Electric strike in
Philadelphia produced a "gentlemen's agreement" to permit access
on October 5, 1960. Not until October 20, however, were pedestrians
and automobiles allowed unhindered access to the plant. 6 For an
employer with fewer resources than General Electric, the two week
period might be crucial. Lack of access might force capitulation.
Moreover, courts are often reluctant to enforce their own orders.
The Philadelphia judiciary was agonizingly slow in enforcing an order
at the Yale and Towne strike, and, indeed, even when contemners were
arrested, the court released them with the finding that the strikers had
no "serious intent or any desire to breach the law and order." 5'
The reason for the failure of many state judges to enforce law
and order is, as we have said before, largely political. It is not a
frequently found admission, of course. Few judges are as candid as
Ohio Appeals Court Judge John J. Duffey [who] confesses
he was worried about having to decide, shortly before the
1960 election, whether a transit workers' strike in Columbus
constituted an illegal secondary boycott. "If I had decided
for the company, I would have lost considerable union support," says Judge Duffey. "If for the union, the Columbus
Dispatch would have blasted me. That sort of thing is
enough to make even the strongest of men blanch a little."
Fortunately for the judge and his conscience the strike was
settled before he had to make a ruling.5'
53 Hopson, Kansas Labor Law and District Court Injunctions, 6 KAN. L.
2-3 (1957).

REv.

1,

54

Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 128 (1964).
65 Id. at 129 n.138.

56Id. at 130.
57 Ibid.
58 The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 15, 1965, p. 1, col. 1. See also State Court
Injunctions, Report of a Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the Corninittee ons Labor and Public Welfare, S. Doc. No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1951).
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The NLRB
The NLRB cannot prevent violence wherever it occurs; 59 that is
properly the domain of the courts--state or federal. However, the
Board has the power to discourage strike misconduct, for it frequently
must pass on reinstatement of violent strikers.
In the last three years, the Board has developed a double standard
for weighing strike violence. If the strike is declared an economic
strike, then strikers who engage in misconduct may be discharged."
But if the Board decides that the strike was called to protest employer
unfair labor practices, the strikers will probably be reinstated. The
Board's position is summarized by Trial Examiner Bennett in Oneita
Knitting Mills, Inc. 1 Though plainly uncomfortable at recommending
the reinstatement of strikers who threw eggs and tomatoes at those
who crossed the picket line, followed employees in cars almost running
them off the road, and grabbed an employee by the leg and forced her
to the ground, he said he had little choice in view of the decisions of
the Board and the courts in the Kohler cases: 62
[E]ngagement in conduct unprotected under Section 7 of
the Act does not, ipso facto, preclude a reinstatement order
for an unfair labor practice striker and that the seriousness
of the employer's unfair labor practices is to be considered
in balancing the issue.
[T] he net result of . . . [these cases] may be that anything

short of aggravated assault will not disqualify such a striker
63

The Board, on remand of the Kohler case, reinstated employees who
engaged in this misconduct:
The Supreme Court appears to recognize the possibility of politics in the state
courts. In United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 3 CCH LAE. L. REP. 1151,415
(1965), the Court was asked to permit removal of a defamation action to the federal
courts. One of the union's arguments was that local courts would be opposed to
unionization and that federal judges would be "less exposed to local pressures than
their state court counterparts . . . ." The Court reluctantly rejected these "appealing" arguments. Id.
51,415, at 65101.
59 But see Potter v. United Cement Workers, 48 L.R.R.M. 2968 (E.D. Tex. 1962)
(Texas PortlandCement Co.). In the 1964 fiscal year, the Board sought only eighteen
petitions for injunctive relief under its discretionary injunction section, the only
section of the act that permits the Board to directly attack strike violence. 29 NLRB
AwN. REP. 133 (1965).
60 See Ekco Prod. Co. (Sta-Brite Div.), 117 N.L.R.B. 137, 221-24 (1957).
61153 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1965).
62 Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, enforced as mnodified, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962), on remand, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (1964).
63
Intermediate Report, 153 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (June 17, 1965).
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1. They actively engaged in halting, circling, blocking,
shouldering, and bumping nonstrikers or job applicants
during the mass picketing or employment office picketing.
2. They verbally harassed, insulted, and abused nonstrikers
at the picket line, their homes, business establishments
and places of amusement.
3. They inspected railroad cars leaving the Kohler plant and
attempted to halt trucks leaving that plant.
The only strikers denied reinstatement were those who engaged in
assaults upon nonstrikers or in threats against their families.
Two intellectual props support the Kohler decision and those
decisions following it. 4 The first is Republic Steel0 5 which, it will be
recalled, states that Congress must have contemplated strike violence
in guaranteeing the right to strike. Apart from the complete failure
of Congress to sanction violence in guaranteeing the right to strike,
the Republic Steel dictum is of doubtful legal validity for these reasons:
1. Republic Steel was decided in 1939-eight years before the
1947 amendments to the act. One of those amendments was the
new phrase in section 7 which guarantees to employees "the right . . .
to refrain from any or all of such [concerted] activities. . .. ," " This

section was added to the act so that "the Board will be prevented
from compelling employees to exercise such [protected] rights against
their will, as it has consistently done in the past. In other words, when
Congress grants to employees the right to engage in specified activities,
it also means to grant them the right to refrain from engaging therein
if they do not wish to do so." 67 This is clear from the House
Conference Report:
The second change made by the House bill in section 7
of the act (which is carried into the conference agreement)
has also an important bearing on the kinds of concerted activities which are protected by section 7. That provision, as
heretofore stated, provides that employees are also to have
the right to refrain from joining in concerted activities with
their fellow employees if they choose to do so. Taken in
conjunction with the provisions of section 8(b) (1) of the
conference agreement (which will be hereafter discussed),
64 Oneita Knitting Mills, 153 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1965) ; Elmira Mach. & Specialty
Works, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1964). See also Trumbull Asphalt Co., 139 N.L.R.B.

1221 (1962).

65Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
684 (1939).
06§ 7, 61 Stat 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §157 (1958).
67 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1948), in 1 NLRB, LEaIsLAIV
HISTORY OF TE LABoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT, 1947, at 318 (1948).
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wherein it is made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7, it is apparent that
many forms and varietes [sic] of concerted activities which
the Board, particularly in its early days, regarded as protected by the act will no longer be treated as having that
protection, since obviously persons who engage in or support
unfair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.'
The right to refuse to engage in union activities is obviously frustrated
when violent strikers are reinstated with back pay under government
sanction.
2. In 1947, Congress also added section 8(b) (1) (A) to the act,
making it an unfair labor practice for a union to coerce or restrain
employees in their section 7 rights,6 9 including the right to refrain
from engaging in union activity.
3. In addition Congress added section 10(c) to the act in 1947.7
This section denies the Board power to reinstate any individual discharged or suspended for cause. It was added to the act "to put
an end to the belief, now widely held and certainly justified by the
Board's decisions, that engaging in union activities carries with it a
license to loaf, wander about the plants, refuse to work, waste time,
break rules, and engage in incivilities and other disorders and
misconduct."

71

The second, and most sophisticated, prop to the Kohler rationale
is the decision of the First Circuit in NLRB v. Thayer CoY2 That
decision said that when a strike is caused by an unfair labor practice
of the employer, "the power of the Board to order reinstatement is
not necessarily dependent upon a determination that the strike activity
was a 'concerted activity' within the protection of § 7." " The court
reasoned that the discharge of strikers may be for cause "or their
reinstatement may not effectuate the policies of the Act, but in certain
circumstances it may." " In short, the Board may determine that
reemployment of persons who take the law into their own hands ful68H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947), in 1 NLRB, LEIsLAT=
1947, at 543-44 (1948).
69 § 8(b) (1) (A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964); § 7,
61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
70
§ 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
71 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIW HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 333 (1948).
72213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
73 Id. at 753.
74 Ibid.
HISTORY OF TixE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATION S AcT,
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fills a larger design. The analytic block to this reasoning is the express
statement in section 10(c) that the Board may not order reinstatement
of employees discharged "for cause." The court's statement that a
discharge is not necessarily for cause when the employer who does
the discharging has engaged in other unlawful conduct " is a distinction which makes no sense. If cause for discharge exists, it must
logically exist independently of prior activities of the employer, who
is subject to a broad range of remedies if he has acted unlawfully.7"
There are at least three flaws in the Kohler reasoning. The first
is the Board's theory that the company's "flagrant" unfair labor practices enraged the strikers beyond reason. This theory assumes that
the strikers were thinking of Kohler's conduct when they engaged in
misconduct. The unfair labor practice in that case was Kohler's refusal
to bargain in good faith. The bargaining, which was carried on over
a period of many months and covered thousands of employees, contained some very complicated issues.77 The connection between individual misconduct and the company's bargaining position was tenuous,
to say the least. Even the Board recognized the weakness of this
theory, for it stated that "while striker participation in .

.

[mass

picketing and home demonstrations] may not be specifically attributable
to any individual instance of .

.

.

[Kohler's] numerous unfair labor

practices perpetrated during that period, the total causative effect of
.

.

. [Kohler's] illegal acts is unquestionable." *7 The real reason

for the violence at Kohler, we believe, was the company's decision to
operate during the strike. Unions view such a decision as the supreme
threat to the strike effort. Naturally, they claim the employer's "unfair" conduct played a large part in causing the strike. But whatever
the employer's conduct, his right to operate his plant during the
strike must not be impinged by threats of strike violence.
The second flaw of Kohler is the Board's preoccupation with the
fear that the company would "profit by its own wrong" if strikers were
not reinstated. Yet the Board's reinstatement order permits the strikers
to profit by their own wrongs. And wrongs they are, for even the
Board does "not condone the mass picketing of the strikers or the
planning and direction of such activity by the union leaders.
75Id. at 753 n.6.
7
OSee NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F2d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 1948) ("The
Act does not authorize the Board to substitute its own ideas of discipline or management for those of the employer, except barring discrimination or discharge for union

membership."); Russell-Newman Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1 (1962); Note, Need for
Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 112 U.
P.&. L. REv. 69 (1963).
77 See Stewart, Conversioi; of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice: II,
49 VA.
78 L. REv. 1297, 1307-11 (1963).
Kohler Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1964).
79 Id. at 1446.
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Finally, the balance struck in Kohler cannot be sustained since its
reasoning ultimately sanctions mob rule. Congress has passed a complex statute which establishes the rights of employees and their representatives and provides remedies if these rights have been violated.
Violence is not part of that scheme. Whether Kohler's labor policy
was antediluvian is beside the point. Congress did not tell employees
or unions that, if their employer committed an unfair labor practice,
they could take the law into their own hands. Kohler rewards those
who do.
It was not always thus. On the Thayer remand from the First
Circuit,80 the Board, which had previously reinstated eighty-three
employees, refused to reinstate strikers who called at the homes of
nonstrikers, told potential nonstrikers they were not threatening "but
that things of that nature have happened during strikes," and strikers
who, in a group of five, accosted another nonstriker near his home with
various threats. Though recognizing that Thayer's unfair labor practices were "of the most serious kind" 8" the Board also recognized its
obligation to protect the section 7 rights of individual employees. The
Board majority was not impressed with the argument that barring
violent strikers from Thayer's employment would give that company
an unconscionable profit. Eight years later, the Board in Kohler
ordered reinstatement of persons who verbally harassed, insulted and
abused nonstrikers at the picket line, their homes, business establishments or places of amusement. Board personnel and philosophy had
shifted; the federal administration had changed.
If the striker does not commit his violence in an unfair labor practice strike, a far different standard is applied. For example, the Board
recently sustained the discharge of an economic striker who, while
drunk, acted up at the pay window and resisted arrest.' In another
case an economic striker who followed a truck, cut in front of it, and
reached inside the truck cab to threaten the driver with a tire iron was
also denied reinstatement.'
That case contains some particularly
candid testimony explaining strike violence:
It is undisputed that the strike duties assigned to Heaney,
Wojciechowski, and Frey on the morning of July 8 were to
follow the Tidewater Oil trucks, or trucks used by Tidewater,
80 H. N. Thayer Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1956).
81 Id.at 1596.
82 United States Plywood Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (June 21, 1965).
83 Tidewater Oil Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1552-55 (1964). See also Valley Die
Cast Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 508, 509 (1961), enforced, 303 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1962);
Revere Metal Art Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1029-30 (1960), enforced, 287 F.2d 632
(2d Cir. 1961).
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to their destination in New York City, to check for fire violations while gasoline was being poured, to check on the
driver's certificate of fitness and the amount of gasoline delivered, and to picket the trucks. These strikers had been
performing their assigned tasks all week without visible
success and decided that they were tired of continuing that
type of strike duty. As Wojciechowski explained, "Frank
Frey that morning had mentioned the fact that he was tired
of playing cowboys and Indians, and so was I. We were
getting nowhere following the trucks. They would dump
the gas and you would eat your heart out watching them
dump the gas. They were getting a $100 a day and we were
getting nothing." 84
The Board has indicated that one unfair labor practice does not
excuse anotherY A party who is wronged has a right to petition
the Board for redress, but the remedy for union misconduct and
employer misconduct is poles apart. Kohler must pay back wages
amounting to millions of dollars."8 It must bargain with the union
and cease all other unlawful activity. On the other hand, should anyone invoke Board sanctions against union misconduct, he would
find that the remedy is a paper tiger. The Board will issue complaints
against unions for violations of section 8(b) (1) (A),8T but the section
8(b) (1) (A) remedy is simply a cease and desist order which comes
ss
months after the violence. In American Photocopy Equip. Co., the
misconduct took place on or about March 7, 1964. On July 31, 1964,
the trial examiner issued his report, finding the union strike effort
unlawful. The NLRB affirmed this order on March 3, 1965. While
this remedy may be a future deterrent, it is no more than a slap on
the wrist at present.
Though for years the Board has argued to the courts of appeals
that it must have wide latitude in fashioning meaningful remedies for
employer unfair labor practices, it has shown no anxiety to make the
section 8 (b) (1) (A) orders fit the violation. The facts in International
Union of Operating Eng'rs (Long Constr. Co.) ' show that certain
employees were beaten while working on the job site. The trial exTidewater Oil Co., supra note 83, at 1552.
See Communications Workers (Ohio Consolidated Tel. Co.), 120 N.L.R.B.
684 (1958), modified on other grounds, 266 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1959), aff'd as modified,
362 U.S. 479 (1960).
86 See NLRB v. Kohler Co., 60 L.R.R.M. 2049 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The Kohler settlement specified payment by Kohler of $3,000,000 in back pay to
individual workers and restoration of certain pension rights estimated at $1,500,000.
See NLRB News Release R-1029, Dec. 30, 1965.
87E.g., Fur Workers Union (American Photocopy Equip. Co.), 151 N.L.R.B.
No. 33 (1965).
88 Ibid.
89 145 N.L.R.B. 554 (1963).
84
85
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aminer recommended that the Board order the union to pay these
employees for the wages they lost when forced to stay away from
work. The Board declined to do so. The gist of the Board's argument
was that these employees had a right to seek damages in the civil
courts of Tennessee.
The Board will not even require the union to pay for the direct
result of physical injury. In International Hodcarriers (Owen
Langston) ' some employees suffered a savage beating as they crossed
the picket line and several required hospitalization and medical attention."' The beatings took place on May 9. Not until May 21 was the
employer able to convince nonstrikers it was safe to return to work.
The trial examiner recommended that the union be required to reimburse these employees for their medical expenses. The Board again
declined. The union, which was found responsible, had merely to
post a notice for sixty days saying it would not engage in such conduct
again. Here, as in Long Construction, the Board's view of its own
competence was in sharp contrast to the remedy it designed in the
Kohler case: "the numerous and complicated factual questions involved
in settling such claims are not such questions as fall within the Board's
special expertise, but do fall within the special competence of judge
and jury." 9
Whether these employees will have the stamina and the
financial resources to pursue the remedy the Board has left them is
pure conjecture. But what is not open to conjecture is the result of
these cases: the union profits by its own unfair labor practices.
Arbitrators
Arbitrators are frequently faced with the question of reinstatement of strikers for misconduct. Moreover, this forum for weighing
strike misconduct has assumed far greater importance since the Supreme Court's 1960 arbitration trilogy. 3 Therefore it is significant
to note that arbitrators, perhaps even more than the Labor Board, are
fond of the theory that strike violence cannot be judged by ordinary
standards of assault and battery. Arbitrator Holly, in a case involving
the General Electric Company," listed the criteria he would use in
weighing strike misconduct:
90145 N.L.R.B. 565 (1963).
91 Id. at 569.
92
1d. at 565; International Union of Operating Eng'rs (Long Constr. Co.), 145
N.L.R.B.
554, 556 (1963).
9
3 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
94 General Elec. Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 1182 (Holly, 1961) ; accord, West Penn Power
Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 169 (Duff, 1963); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1273
(Gill, 1962) ; American Enka Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 441 (Updegraff, 1962) ; Southwest
Steel Prods., 31 Lab. Arb. 552 (Caraway, 1958).
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1. How serious was the offense in terms of injury to persons
or damage to property?
2. Was the act provoked or unprovoked?
3. Was the act a premeditated one of aggression, or was it a
spur of the moment reaction to an unanticipated situation?
4. Were remedies at law available for the offense, and if so,
were they exercised? Was the conduct more properly
the concern of civil authorities than the concern of the
employer?
5. Was the conduct destructive of good employee-employer
relations ?
6. Was the conduct destructive of good community relations? Did the conduct increase community fears and
did terror result?
7. What will be the effect of the administration of the discipline? Or, to put it another way, what purposes are to
be accomplished by discipline? Will it restore good relations? Will it create a respect for law and order? Or,
is the discipline being administered in a spirit of vindicativeness [sic] or for the purpose of establishing a "show
case"?
8. Was the disciplinary action administered without discrimination?
9. Was the conduct and its results such that it would be
unreasonable to expect that the employee could be reabsorbed into the work force? 5
Applying these criteria, the arbitrator, although suspending and
revoking their seniority rights, reinstated the following employees: a
striker who struck another in the jaw (since little injury was inflicted),
a striker who broke another's windshield (since "the striker's action
was spontaneous"), a striker involved in an attack on a fellow worker's
car (since "the damage that he inflicted was meager"), and a striker
who opened a car door and kicked the driver (though discharge would
have been proper if it were "not for the highly inflamed atmosphere
surrounding the incident").
General Electric was held responsible for part of the violence:
Labor history amply demonstrates that token picketing is
practiced if the employer closes the plant during a strike, and
that picket line incidents almost inevitably occur when the
plant is kept open. It must be presumed that Company offi9

5 General Elec. Co., supra note 94, at 1185-86.
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cials were aware of this possibility. Although the Company
had a legal right to keep the plant open, its decision to do so
gives it some share of the responsibility for creating an environment conducive to violence.98
These sentiments are in sharp contrast to those of a three judge
federal court in a labor case:
The fact that a large group of individuals may have a
grievance, just or unjust, against an owner of property will
not warrant a resort to violence to remedy that grievance,
nor will the hazard, inconvenience, and expense involved
in suppressing the violence justify the state in refusing to
enforce the law or in 7depriving the owner of his property or
his right to enjoy it.9
Conclusion
Law and order should be enforced by the state. But because
unions possess the political power to influence elections, and the power
to veto arbitrators under a contract or other agreement, they have
successfully prevented timely action in cases of strike violence." We
believe that labor relations without law and order are little more than
labor anarchy. We propose to restore the injunctive power to federal
courts, thus permitting them to remedy violence in labor relations. A
federal judge, appointed for life and adequately paid, is better equipped
than any other person to view picket line misconduct dispassionately.
Any attempt to restore federal injunctive power over picket line
violence must overcome one of the shibboleths that is part of the folklore of American labor law-"government by injunction." Frank96

1d. at 1186.
General Electric has refused to accept as binding the decision of Arbitrator
Gomberg in General Electric Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 490 (1965). See the press release
of General Electric at 60 LRR 203-04. The most objectionable feature of the Arbitrator's decision was that strike violence has to result in injury to persons or property
before discipline could be issued.
97
Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 284, 390 (D. Minn. 1936).
Judge Paul Hays of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
formerly a labor arbitrator, has described the political nature of arbitration in these
terms :
In literally thousands of cases every year decisions are made by arbitrators
who are wholly unfitted for their jobs, who do not have the requisite knowledge, training, skill, intelligence and character. In fact, a proportion of arbitration awards, no one knows how large a proportion, is decided not on the
basis of the evidence or of the contract or other proper considerations, but in
a way calculated to encourage the arbitrator's being hired for other arbitration cases.
Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1035 (1965).
98There are, of course, many state police officers and judges who do not permit
strike violence, regardless of the political influence of those involved. See Aaron,
Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-PartI: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REv. 951, 977-80

(1964).
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furter and Greene inveighed mightily against "government by injunction." 9 The phrase capsuled many years of abuse into a handy
tag. It epitomized the loose injunctive procedures of the federal courts,
which enjoined conduct they found socially undesirable-especially secondary boycotts.
What "government by injunction" really means is that judges
should not establish labor policy by enjoining conduct they find indefensible. But since 1935, the legislature and not the judge has
spoken, and it has spoken with sufficient precision that the courts are
no longer left free to establish labor policy.
Labor injunctions are not foreign to federal judges. Since 1947
federal district courts throughout the country have been hearing injunction suits started by the NLRB. 0 ° These injunction suits cover
conduct The Labor Injunction said must be forever immunized from
judicial taint. Moreover, NLRB cease and desist orders are not, and
have never been, self-enforcing. The Board must get its orders enforced against recalcitrant respondents in the courts of appeals.1 1
Since these cases now number in the hundreds, it is fatuous to say that
federal appellate judges, too, are ignorant of the facts of labor life.
A federal judge is perfectly capable of hearing cases involving
strike violence. That he may know little of the exaggerated mystique
of labor relations is no answer. If federal judges can change the social
and political fabric of the nation, as they have done in the areas of
racial segregation 102 and state legislative apportionment, 10 3 they are
surely capable of limiting strike violence under a clear mandate from
Congress.
Unions certainly do not object to government by an injunction
when they are the successful plaintiff. A "cease and desist order"
entered by the NLRB against an employer, when enforced by a court
of appeals, is essentially an injunction. Upon enactment of the original Wagner Act, unions promptly began to file unfair labor practice
charges seeking cease and desist orders, many of which were enforced
in court. Since Lincoln Mills, 4 unions have sought (and obtained)
99

FRANKFURTER

&

GREENE, THE LABOR

INjUNCTION 1 (1930).

100 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, the Board filed 252 10(l) petitions.
29 NLRB ANN. REP. 135 (1965). In the preceding year, it filed 215. 28 NLRB
ANN. REP. 147 (1964). See Note, Temporary Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(l)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv. 460 (1963). Section 10(l) makes it
mandatory for the General Counsel to seek an injunction when unfair labor practices
are charged involving strikes or picketing either in a secondary boycott, jurisdictional
dispute or organizational context.
10149
Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
102
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ;
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
see Cooper
10 3 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ;
see The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 244-53 (1964).
104 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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injunctions against employers, compelling them to arbitrate. There
is nothing evil or antisocial about this conduct. Unions are entitled to
injunctive redress if a violation of law or of an agreement has occurred.
The point is simply that the same redress should be available to employers. To achieve this, we propose the following amendments to the
Norris-La Guardia Act:
Section 6. Section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act "' abolishes
ordinary tests of agency, and sets up an evidentiary rule that is extremely difficult to meet. Its reach was construed in United Bhd. of
Carpentersv. United States: .06
We hold that its [Section 6's] purpose and effect was to
relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and members of those organizations from liability for damages or
imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by
some individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member charged with
responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior
authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of
their perpetration.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion well states the result of
this holding: "But the conditions formulated by this Court, which must
now be met before a union may be held to liability, are practically
unrealizable, whether in the case of a big or small union, a local or an
international. Escape from responsibility can be easily contrived." 107
The Norris-LaGuardia test for agency was specifically rejected in
two sections of Taft-Hartley: section 2(13) and section 301 (e),1011 in
almost identical fashion, return to the common-law tests of agency.
This follows the intent of Congress that: "Hence, under the conference
agreement, as under the House bill, both employers and labor organizations will be responsible for the acts of their agents in accordance with
the ordinary common law rules of agency (and only ordinary evidence
will be required to establish the agent's authority)." 109

We propose to

apply Taft-Hartley agency standards (section 2(13)) to NorrisLa Guardia injunctions by amending section 6 to read: "In determining
whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to
Norris-La Guardia Act § 6, 47 Stat 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964).
106330 U.S. 395, 403 (1947).
lo7 Id. at 415; see Heintz Mfg. Co. v. Local 515, UAW, 20 F. Supp. 116 (E.D.
Pa. 1936).
108§2(13), 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1964); §301(e), 61 Stat.
157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1964).
109H.R. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947), in 1 NLRB, LEGms.ATz
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 540 (1948).
105
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make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall
not be controlling." There is no good reason why unions should not
be as liable as any other respondents for the acts of their agents.
Section 7. Unions should be entitled to no less, but no more,
than any other defendant. We have shown previously that it is almost
impossible for an employer to meet the standards of section 7 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, and we therefore propose to amend this section so that it conforms more closely to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. That part of subsection (e) of Rule 65 which
makes the rule inapplicable to labor disputes would have to be repealed.
Some further changes would be needed. In the absence of a
special statute, federal courts have only diversity jurisdiction, and
absent diversity, union defendants who clearly participated in strike
violence have been dismissed as parties defendant."' It is obviously
unfair to permit suits against diversity defendants who engage in violence, yet immunize nondiversity defendants who engage in the same
conduct. In addition, restraint and coercion should be defined so that
the federal courts will not be bound by definitions supplied by the
NLRB. The Board's limited idea of restraint and coercion, subject
to the prevailing political whims, requires expansion. Recommended
subsection (c) is obviously necessary to prevent any possible holding
that a party seeking relief must first go to the NLRB or to an arbitrator. The proposed section 7 would read as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall, without
respect to the amount in controversy, or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties, have jurisdiction to hear and, where
appropriate, to grant equitable relief in suits between an employer in an industry affecting commerce as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act and a labor organization,
where it is alleged that either party is engaged in, or has
encouraged or induced acts of restraint or coercion growing
out of, or during the course of any strike, work stoppage,
withholding of services, or lockout, where such conduct is not
otherwise enjoinable under Section 10(l) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
(a) As used in this Section, restraint or coercion shall mean,
but shall not be limited to, mass picketing, actual or threatened physical violence, direct or indirect prevention of ingress
or egress, coercion and intimidation, and destruction of property, without regard to whether such acts or threats are per10
3
J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron Workers Local 782, 173 F. Supp. 319, 321 (W.D.
Ky. 1959).
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formed at the location of the plant, plants, or other facilities
undergoing such strike, work stoppage, withholding of services, or lockout.
(b) In any suit brought under this Section, the district courts
of the United States shall be governed by the rules of civil
procedure then applicable to injunctions and equitable relief.
(c) No party seeking relief under this section shall, as a
condition to such relief, be required to pursue any other
available legal, equitable, administrative or contractual
remedy.
Section 8. Section 8 of Norris-La Guardia makes injunctive relief
against violence unavailable if the party seeking relief has "failed to
comply with any obligation imposed by law," or has failed to settle
reasonably the dispute with available governmental machinery for
mediation, or voluntary arbitration or negotiation.'
It bears repeating that this section was enacted in 1932, three years before the Wagner Act required employers to bargain with unions that represent a
majority of their employees." 2 The reach of section 8 is shown by
Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers' Local 591.-13

In that case,

unions asked a theatre to fire a nonunion sign writer. When the
theatre refused, stench bombs were thrown into the theatre and "unfair" signs appeared outside the box office. The theatre satisfied the
court that public officers were unable to protect it adequately against
stench bombs and mutilation of its displays; but no injunction issued
because the theatre had not made every effort to mediate, conciliate
or arbitrate the dispute.
There are two good and sufficient reasons why the theatre should
not be required to "mediate" this dispute. The union might not have
represented any employees. A settlement reached by an outside union
and the employer would violate rights guaranteed to the employees by
the NLRA." 4 In addition, requiring the theatre to negotiate under
threats of violence encourages resort to these tactics.
We have no quarrel with the proposition that the employer-or
any plaintiff-must comply with all legal bargaining obligations. But
we do not believe that anyone must be required to mediate, much less
arbitrate, until law and order is restored. Mediation or arbitration
III Norris-La Guardia Act § 8, 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
112§ 8(5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
113 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1934). See also Oswald v. Leader, 20 F. Supp.
876 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (no irreparable injury where union physically seized plant;
plaintiff failed to "settle" the seizure by negotiations).
"14 § 7, 49 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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under threat of continued violence is hardly designed to produce a truly
voluntary solution of any kind.
The National Labor Relations Board, which polices the duty to
bargain, does not require one to bargain under mob rule. Kohler was
justified in breaking off negotiations on two separate occasions when
violence at the plant and at the homes of nonstrikers reached "mob
proportions." "' But it is clear that satisfaction of the bargaining
obligation under the National Labor Relations Act does not satisfy
section 8 of Norris-La Guardia. As the Fifth Circuit told an employer
who argued he need only bargain with a majority representative, "this
attitude, correct enough under the National Labor Relations Act
. . . does not satisfy the affirmative requirements of .
La Guardia.
116

.

.

Norris-

Indeed, section 8 is perhaps the most obsolete section of NorrisLa Guardia. It has been read to bar injunctions where two unions
employed violence during a campaign for recognition. Obviously,
recognition of either union would subject the employer to Board action
for violation of the Act, 117 but recourse to the National Labor Rela-

tions Board to settle the issue still does not satisfy the requirements of
section 8 that the plaintiff mediate, conciliate or arbitrate.-"" That
such strikes are now unfair labor practices 119 is no answer; rather, it
shows how remote the framework of Norris-La Guardia is from the
present time.
In 1944 the Supreme Court ruled in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Toledo P. & W.R.R 2 ° that the requirements of section 8
are cumulative; the plaintiff must comply with his obligations under
law and mediate and engage in voluntary arbitration, even if strike
violence is involved. The Court was not at all troubled by withholding
the one effective remedy against strike violence for, as it observed,
"other means of protection remain. Suits for recovery of damages
still may be brought in the federal courts, when federal jurisdiction is
shown to exist." 11 The reach of the Toledo holding is vividly shown
by General Elec. Co. v. Goiack.2
In that strike the union barred
115Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1176 (1960), modified, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
116 Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1942).
117 Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
118 See Cupples Co. v. AFL, 20 F. Supp. 894, 899-900 (E.D. Mo. 1937).
119 61 Stat 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1964).
120 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
121 Id. at 63.
1= 68 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ind. 1946). See also Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz,
111 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1940); Newton v. Laclede Steel Co., 80 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.
1935) ; United Elec. Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 714 (1936).
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entrance to the plant by mass picketing. However, it did consent to
permit certain persons to enter, and these employees were handed union
passes in order to go to work. A protest by other employees to the
chief of police that the right of ingress and egress did not depend on a
union pass brought this answer: "I can't do you any good; I don't
have enough manpower." 13 His officers were present during mass
picketing, but their presence was futile. "The only inference that can
be drawn from the evidence is that a person who crossed the picket line
on the 7th or 12th of February would have had to come in bodily contact with the pickets although a police officer would have been at his
side at the time." 'w The court concluded that public officers were
derelict in their duty of furnishing adequate protection for those who
wished to work. The requirements of section 7 were overwhelmingly
met. But the company had not, in the court's view, gone as far as it
should have in negotiating with the union responsible for this conduct.
The injunction was denied.
Today it is the NLRB, and not a district court, which weighs the
duty to bargain and its fulfillment. The Wagner Act of 1935 required the employer to bargain; the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947
further defined that duty 2 5 and established the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service.1 26 There were no comparable obligations or
facilities in 1932 when Norris-La Guardia was passed. Repeal of
section 8 is called for; the principles underlying the broad requirements
of the section have since been accomplished by later legislation.
Section 9. The requirements of section 9 of adequate and specific
findings of fact are essentially duplicated by Rule 65. This section
should therefore be repealed.
123 68

F. Supp. at 687.

124 Ibid.
125 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
12661 Stat. 152 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§171-85 (1964).

